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Abstract 
We study the link between neighborhood immigrant concentration and crime in England. 
Over previous decades there has been a significant increase in the number of immigrant 
enclaves, where immigrants account for a substantial fraction of the local population. Using 
both recorded crime and self-reported crime victimization data, we find that crime is 
significantly lower in those neighborhoods with sizeable immigrant population shares. The 
effect is non-linear and only becomes significant in enclaves. The crime reducing effect is 
substantially enhanced if the enclave is composed of immigrants from the same ethnic 
background. We discuss some possible mechanisms for the results we observe. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A perennial concern expressed by academics and policymakers has been the tendency for 
newly arriving immigrants to locate in neighborhoods that already have substantial immigrant 
populations. There appears to be a general view that this can be an unfortunate outcome both 
for the immigrant community and for society more generally. The former are presumed to 
suffer because such segregation tends to discourage the assimilation of immigrants into the 
socio-economic fabric of the host country. Society is presumed to suffer because such 
communities become cut-off from the rest, which runs the risk of increased alienation.  
In the United States, the evidence shows that immigrant segregation actually declined 
in the first part of the twentieth century, but has been rising significantly over the past few 
decades (Cutler et al., 2008a). The first contribution of this paper is to provide evidence on 
the pattern of immigrant segregation in England over the past few decades. To our knowledge, 
such an analysis has not been conducted before. In contrast to the U.S., we find a modest 
decline in segregation since 1971, both in aggregate and for particular immigrant groups. 
However, we also show that the rise in the number of immigrants that have arrived in the last 
few decades has generated an increase in the number of neighborhoods that have high 
immigrant shares – the so-called enclaves. Increasing fractions of immigrants live in these 
enclaves. 
What of the alleged impact of such immigrant segregation on individual outcomes 
such as earnings and employment? This question has received extensive attention in recent 
years. Cutler et al. (2008b) discuss evidence on this and highlight the problems resulting from 
endogenous selection into neighborhoods. Using instrumental variable estimation methods to 
circumvent this, they conclude that there is negative selection into immigrant neighborhoods 
that obscures an overall positive impact of ethnic concentration on immigrant outcomes.  
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More recently, attempts have been made to identify the impact of immigrant 
segregation on economic outcomes using quasi-experimental evidence. Both Edin et al. (2003) 
and Damm (2009) exploit a dispersal policy used to allocate refugees in Scandinavian 
countries to try to avoid the problem of self-selection of migrants into certain areas. They find 
strong evidence that refugees with unfavorable unobserved characteristics self-select into 
areas with higher immigrant shares. Instrumental variable estimates suggest that, after 
controlling for such self-selection, there is a substantial positive impact on immigrant wages 
from living in such areas. 
The outcomes that have been considered thus far in the economics literature tend to be 
focused on the labor market (e.g. wages and employment) or on outcomes that directly affect 
performance in the labor market (e.g. language ability or educational attainment), while 
Bertrand et al. (2000) provide evidence on the role of ethnic segregation in a neighborhood 
on welfare participation. To further the evidence base, this paper explores the consequences 
of immigrant residential segregation on an alternative outcome of key interest, namely 
crime.1  
There have, of course, been papers that explore the consequences of neighborhoods 
on crime. Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) examine why crime is higher in big cities, and 
Glaeser et al. (1996) model the social interactions that occur between individuals that lead to 
cross-neighborhood variances in crime rates. More closely related to this paper, Kling et al. 
(2005) examine the impact of neighborhood poverty levels on youth crime rates using a 
randomized experiment. Results show that young women benefit from relocating to lower-
poverty areas, while the effect is more mixed for males. Earlier work by Case and Katz (1991) 
found that, in a sample of low-income Boston neighborhoods, residence in a neighborhood in 
which a large proportion of other youths were involved in crime was associated with a 
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substantial increase in an individual’s probability of being involved in crime. However, none 
of these papers was focused on the link between immigrant segregation and crime.  
 Little empirical attention has been paid to the existence of potential non-linearities in 
the segregation-outcome research area. Most studies tend to use either the group share of the 
local population or a dissimilarity index to measure segregation. Even the quasi-experimental 
evidence that is claimed to be focused on enclaves in fact uses the log of the size of the ethnic 
group as the key explanatory variable and therefore imposes log-linearity on the estimated 
effect. This seems somewhat surprising since there are good reasons to think that such effects 
may be non-linear. Consider for example the idea that segregation is bad because it decreases 
the rate of host country skill acquisition (e.g. of language skills). Such effects may only 
become apparent in neighborhoods with a sufficient concentration of immigrants. Low-level 
concentrations of immigrants may not reach a critical mass that allows migrants to isolate 
themselves in this way. 
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we use four decades of U.K. 
census data to illustrate the scale of changes in immigrant residential segregation. We find 
evidence of a small decline in average segregation for immigrants, but a concomitant rise in 
the share of immigrants who live in high-density immigrant neighborhoods. Section 3 
presents our key empirical findings. Using recorded crime data and self-reported crime 
victimization data, we report a strong negative link between living in areas with high 
immigrant populations and crime. For more de-segregated areas, we find no such link. The 
effects become more pronounced in enclaves that are composed of immigrants from the same 
region of the world. Such effects are observed for both natives and immigrants. In Section 4 
we discuss possible interpretations of this result and provide some suggestive survey 
evidence that speaks to the relevance of these interpretations. Our conclusions are given in 
Section 5. 
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2. IMMIGRANT NEIGHBORHOODS OVER TIME 
In this section, we provide evidence on the evolution of immigrant neighborhood segregation 
over time in England, drawing on data for English areas in the U.K. census.2 We address two 
key questions. First, on average, has segregation risen or fallen? Second, are there pockets of 
substantial immigrant concentration and have such neighborhoods become more or less 
common? To answer these questions, we make use of the 1971-2001 decennial censuses that 
provide 100 percent counts of all residents by country of birth. In contrast to the U.S. census, 
the U.K. census has not maintained a consistent low-level geographical definition over time. 
This makes comparisons across the censuses more difficult. 
Our base geography uses the 1981 census wards. Wards are constructed for the 
purposes of elections to local councils. These wards had an average population of 5,407 in 
1981. However, they are very heterogeneous, with a population standard deviation of 4,226. 
For the purposes of the census, wards are disaggregated into individual enumeration districts 
(ED) containing around 450 residents. Unfortunately, EDs are not exactly the same across 
censuses, so there is no way of constructing consistent EDs through time. However, it is 
possible to combine EDs from the 1971 and 1991 censuses into the 1981 ward areas.3 The 
geography of the census was radically altered in 2001, with EDs replaced by much smaller 
Output Areas (OAs). However, there is a link file from 2001 OAs to 1991 EDs that allows us 
to move to the 1981 wards.4 This gives us a set of around 8,500 consistent neighborhoods in 
England across censuses. These neighborhoods can then be grouped into 353 local authorities.  
Our first goal is to use these data to provide a picture of the extent and change in 
immigrant segregation across England. There is an extensive U.S. literature on the evolution 
of both ethnic and immigrant segregation over time (see Cutler et al. (1999, 2008a)) but no 
extant research for the U.K.. There are various measures that are used to capture the extent of 
segregation within a population (see Maignan et al., 2003). Such indices essentially compare 
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the distribution of members of a particular group with that of individuals who are not 
members of the group (e.g. by race, nationality etc.). In what follows, we present evidence for 
the commonly used dissimilarity index.5 This is calculated by dividing the local authority into 
neighborhoods (wards in our case), indexed i, and using the formula: 
|
nongroup
nongroup
group
group
|
2
1
D
total
i
i total
i    
 
where groupi denotes the number of relevant immigrant group members living in ward i, 
grouptotal denotes the number living in the entire local authority, and nongroupi and 
nongrouptotal are similarly defined for residents not belonging to the group. This dissimilarity 
index takes values between zero and one, with zero when each neighborhood contains a 
constant proportion of group members and one when group members never share 
neighborhoods with non-group members. Clearly, this measure is not independent of the 
number of neighborhoods within the local area, which highlights the need for a consistent set 
of neighborhoods over time to allow inference on the trends in segregation. We measure this 
index for both immigrants as a whole and for immigrant groups defined by region-of-birth. 
For the latter, we focus on five groups: Irish, South Asian (Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi), 
European, African New Commonwealth and Old Commonwealth (Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand). These are the only groups that can be consistently identified across the four 
Censuses. 
Table 1 provides some summary statistics. The first point to note is that the number of 
immigrants in England has risen from just under 3 million in 1971 to over 4.5 million by 
2001. As a share of the population, the comparable figures are 6.2 percent and 8.9 percent. 
The dissimilarity index show gentle declines across each census. Thus, the dissimilarity index 
has declined from 0.232 to 0.183 across the four censuses. This is in marked contrast to the 
experience of the United States, where the trend has been in the opposite direction. Cutler et 
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al. (2008a) show that over the same period, their dissimilarity index (which is not comparable 
in magnitudes to ours) rose from 0.463 to 0.560. One further point deserves mention. In all 
the calculations in Table 1, we weight the data by the number of immigrants in the area. Thus, 
the indices measure segregation from the perspective of the average immigrant. This is the 
standard approach in this literature. If however we weighted by the total population in the 
area, we would see a smaller decline in the dissimilarity index.  
The decline in immigrant segregation has occurred across all the region-of-birth 
groups that we can consistently identify. The five groups we focus on accounted for two-
thirds of all immigrants in both 1971 and 2001. Levels of segregation differ markedly across 
the groups. The dissimilarity index is over twice as large for the South Asian group as for the 
Irish and Europeans, with African immigrants also exhibiting high levels of segregation. In 
spite of this, there have been declines in the dissimilarity indices for each of these groups.6 
We can focus more closely on the spatial distribution of immigrants using the 
neighborhood definition from the 2001 census. This identifies over 32,000 Lower Super 
Output Areas (LSOAs) with an average population of around 1,500. That there is a 
significant dispersion of immigrant shares across LSOAs in the 2001 census is shown in 
Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows the distribution of immigrant shares with a long spread in the 
upper tail as one reaches high immigrant shares. Figure 2 shows a map of England with 
immigrant densities across LSOAs. The darker parts of the Figure denote higher immigrant 
shares, which tend to be clustered in and around the more urban areas of the country. 
Indices of segregation are useful descriptors of the average, but they fail to adequately 
account for the variation in segregation across areas. Most importantly, it is possible to have 
both a decline in overall segregation and a rise in the proportion of neighborhoods that have 
become increasingly segregated. All that is needed is for the more even distribution of 
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immigrants in the neighborhoods that are not heavily segregated to outweigh the effects of 
the more segregated neighborhoods. We now show that this is indeed what has happened in 
England over the last thirty years. 
Table A2 in the Appendix disaggregates the wards by the share of immigrants in the 
population. In Panel A, we report the percentage of wards that have particular shares of 
immigrants for each of the census years. Thus for example, the first column for 1971 shows 
that 4.8 percent of wards (i.e. 404 wards) had less than a 1 percent immigrant share of the 
local population (but at least some immigrants), whilst 1.3 percent of wards (i.e. 108 wards) 
had between 30-50 percent immigrant share. In Panel B of the Table, we report the 
distribution of the total immigrant population across these different wards. So again, the first 
column for 1971 shows that only 0.5 percent of all immigrants (i.e. 13,106 immigrants) lived 
in wards that had between a 0-1 percent immigrant share, while 13.9 percent (i.e. 402,845 
immigrants) lived in wards that had between a 30-50 percent immigrant share. 
Two facts stand out from an examination of Table A2. First, there is a clear decline in 
the number of wards that have a very small immigrant share. In 1971, there were 407 wards 
that had less than a 1 percent immigrant share. By 2001, this had fallen to 69 wards. In other 
words, it is almost impossible to live in England today and not have at least some immigrants 
living in the same neighborhood. Second, at the other end of the scale, the number of wards 
that have very high immigrant densities has increased. In 1971, only 114 wards had more 
than a 30 percent immigrant share in the population. By 2001, 367 had this attribute. 
Therefore, the decline in overall segregation has been driven by a widening out of the 
neighborhoods in which immigrants live and the erosion of low-immigrant neighborhoods. 
However, at the same time, an increasingly segregated set of neighborhoods has also 
developed. Furthermore, these immigrant enclaves are relevant for a growing share of 
immigrants. By 2001, 31.1 percent of all immigrants - i.e. 1.41 million lived in 
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neighborhoods where at least 30 percent of their neighbors were also immigrants. The 
comparable figures for 1971 were 14.6 percent and 0.42 million. There are also significant 
differences across immigrant groups. Reflecting the findings using the dissimilarity index, we 
find that less than one-quarter of Irish and European immigrants live in neighborhoods with 
more than a 30 percent immigrant population in 2001, while approximately 40 percent of 
Asian and African immigrants live in such areas. 
The definition of an immigrant enclave we adopt here is a neighborhood with at least 
30 percent immigrant population (see the darkest shaded areas of Figure 2). It should be 
noted that there is no commonly accepted definition of an enclave. In their paper on Swedish 
immigrant enclaves, Edin et al. (2003) define enclaves for specific nationalities when their 
share in the neighborhood population is at least twice as high as their share in the overall 
population. In our context since immigrants account for almost 9 percent of the population, 
we might define an enclave as being a neighborhood with at least an 18 percent immigrant 
share on this definition. As we will show in the next section, nothing crucial hangs on the 
exact cut-off point we use. 
 Unsurprisingly, these immigrant enclaves rarely revert back to the average. From one 
census to the next, less than one-in-ten of those wards with initially more than 30 percent 
immigrants are not still in the same category at the next census. Even more remarkably, of the 
114 wards that had more than a 30 percent immigrant share in 1971, 96 of them remained so 
by 2001. Can we account for the growth in enclaves? A simple simulation suggests that 
immigrant inflows combined with location persistence can explain much of the trend. 
Suppose we calculate the distribution of immigrants across wards in 1971 and assume that the 
national increase in the stock of immigrants since then was distributed in exactly the same 
way. In other words, new immigrants located in the same locations, and in the same 
proportions, as previously. Then by 2001, we would have expected that 3.9 percent of wards 
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were enclaves and that 32.4 percent of all immigrants would live in these enclaves. Recall 
that the actual figures for 2001 were 4.3 percent and 31.1 percent respectively. Thus, we 
almost exactly match the growth in enclaves over the period. Of course, we do not perfectly 
predict which wards became enclaves between 1971 and 2001. Nevertheless, we do predict 
50 percent of them correctly. Thus while enclave formation is more complicated than simply 
being a function of large initial immigrant shares and increased immigration, the changes we 
have observed since 1971 are largely the result of rising immigration and persistence in 
location choice. 
3. MAIN RESULTS 
Our key conclusion from the analysis of neighborhood data is that, while segregation in 
England as a whole has modestly declined over the last few decades, there has been a sharp 
increase in the number of enclaves and in the share of the population who live in such 
neighborhoods. In this section, we test whether such neighborhoods matter in terms of a key 
socio-economic outcome – crime.  
To study connections between crime and immigrant enclaves, we require data at a 
low-level of geography. In general, such data have not been historically available in England. 
Recorded crime is reported by Police Forces (of which there are 39) and the lowest 
geographical level that such data have been published is the local authority level. However, in 
2004, 2007 and 2010, indices of multiple deprivation (IMD) were created for every lower 
super output area (LSOA) in England. There are 32,482 LSOAs in England, with an average 
population of 1,513.  
One component of the IMD is a crime score. The crime score was constructed from 
geo-coded recorded crime data on 33 different crime types over the previous 12 months 
provided by all Police Forces. The 33 crime types were then aggregated into four crime 
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groups – violence, criminal damage, burglary and theft. This data was then converted into 
crime rates and then combined by factor analysis to generate a single index of recorded crime 
for each LSOA.7 The strength of this data is that it is made up from over 5,000,000 individual 
crime reports and thus provides large sample sizes even for such low-level geographies. The 
disadvantage is that the data is only provided as a crime score so we cannot examine 
differential effects across crime types. Figure 3 shows the distribution of these crime scores 
across LSOAs in England, split down by score quintiles (with the lightest shading denoting 
the lowest crime quintile, through to the darkest shading denoting the highest crime quintile). 
Our second source of data is the British Crime Survey (BCS). The BCS is a large 
annual cross-section survey that is used to produce aggregate figures on crime victimisation 
for Britain. The sample sizes are now approximately 45,000 in each year (since the early 
2000s) and the survey began in 1982. Since 2006, we have obtained access to lower-level 
geographical identifiers for each survey respondent. These identifiers provide us with the 
LSOA of each respondent that can then be matched to the same data as the crime index. The 
advantage of this data is that it allows us to control for individual characteristics and to use an 
alternative measure of crime. There are two main disadvantages. First, given the sample size, 
we observe few individuals in any one LSOA. Second, the crime measure we use from the 
BCS is self-reported victimisation (both violent and non-violent). The willingness to report 
such victimisation may itself vary by immigrant status.8 
A natural first question is whether the enclaves are different from other areas, both in 
terms of crime and other socio-economic characteristics? To shed light on this, Table 2 
reports various outcome measures for LSOAs, broken into categories on the basis of 
immigrant share in the local population. The distribution of all LSOAs by immigrant share is 
shown in Figure 1. The components of the indices of deprivation are defined such that a 
larger number indicates a more negative outcome. Therefore, for crime, immigrant enclaves 
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have substantially higher rates than those neighborhoods with lower immigrant shares. This 
poor outcome for enclaves is generally true across the various measures, suggesting that such 
neighborhoods are relatively deprived. 
Unsurprisingly, the share of Black and Asian people rises as we move to more 
immigrant-dense areas. For England as a whole, 50.4 percent of the Black population are 
immigrants and 52.8 percent of the Asian population. This compares with only 5.2 percent of 
the white population. This raises a tricky issue. In practice, it will be difficult to separately 
identify the role of ethnicity and immigration in analyzing the enclaves. We know from Table 
2 that 2,504 LSOAs have more than 30 percent immigrant population. If instead we 
calculated the number of LSOAs that had more than a 30 percent non-white population, we 
would get 2,986. Two-thirds of these non-white enclaves are also immigrant enclaves, while 
the remaining one-third are all in the 10-30 percent immigrant-density group. Thus, when we 
talk of immigrant enclaves it is important to understand that these are generally ethnic 
enclaves as well.  
In Table 3, we show results from when we regress the crime score in each LSOA on 
indicators of immigrant density and other controls. All the measures of immigrant population 
at the LSOA level come from the 2001 Census. We pool the three years of crime scores 
(2004, 2007 and 2010) together and include year dummies.9 In all results, we also include a 
full set of local authority dummies so that we are identifying the effects within local 
authorities. In all the analysis of this section, we cluster the standard errors at the local 
authority level. In the first column, we just include the immigrant density indicators. There is 
a clear and significant rise in crime as we move to areas with a higher immigrant population. 
This is no real surprise since we know from Table 2 that these areas have more social and 
economic problems that are known to be associated with higher crime rates. 
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In the second column of the Table, we control for an extensive set of LSOA-level 
controls. These include the other components of the indices of deprivation and a set of socio-
demographic controls from the 2001 census data, including age, education and housing types 
and population density. With these controls included, we see a significantly different pattern 
of crime across immigrant neighborhoods. Low-levels of immigrant population in an area are 
now associated with somewhat higher crime rates (relative to areas with very low immigrant 
shares). In contrast, crime is lower in the enclaves. Indeed crime in the enclaves is 
significantly lower than in both areas with average immigrant shares and in areas that have 
almost no immigrants. In terms of magnitude, an enclave reduces the crime score of a 
neighborhood by 0.2 standard deviations. 
In the third column, we also include a set of non-white neighborhood share effects. 
We commented above on the close correlation between immigrant and non-white 
neighborhoods in England. The results suggest that the positive effect of low-level 
immigration on crime disappears when we control for racial composition of the neighborhood, 
but the enclave effect remains strong and significant.  
In the final column, we allow for cross-neighborhood effects. It seems unlikely that 
the definition of neighborhood used in this, or any other, paper perfectly matches the relevant 
neighborhood from the perspective of the outcome variable. Criminals can cross artificial 
neighborhood boundaries to commit crime and individuals can be victims of crime outside 
their residential neighborhood. Since our neighborhoods have an average population of only 
1,500, we might expect a wider measure of the neighborhood to matter. To examine this issue, 
we first calculate the population-weighted centroid of each LSOA. We then determine the 
five closest LSOAs and compute the average immigrant density in this neighboring area. We 
include this average area density in addition to the LSOA neighborhood share dummies.10 
There is a marginally significant negative effect from area immigrant densities on 
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neighborhood crime, but the neighborhood enclave effect remains significantly negative. This 
suggests that the overall effect of enclaves on crime is a combination of the neighborhood 
effect and spillovers from the area effect. 
 The models estimated in Table 3 (and those to come) all use dummy variables to 
indicate the share of immigrants in the local population. Whilst this allows for a non-linear 
relationship, it does not exploit the full cross-sectional variation in the immigrant share and 
could be missing important features of the immigrant share-crime link. To examine this in 
more detail, we re-estimated the specifications in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 replacing the 
share dummies with individual percentile dummies. We then fitted a local polynomial to 
these percentile estimates to provide a graphical illustration of the variation in the crime score 
due to immigrant share. Figures 4A and 4B show the result, with 95 percent confidence bands. 
The relationship is very clearly non-linear, and significantly negative only when we reach 
neighborhoods with more than around 30 percent immigrant share. Thus, our focus on 
enclaves as areas with more than a 30 percent share seems appropriate. To further 
demonstrate this, Table A3 reports estimates for a range of possible cut-off points for the 
immigrant enclave. While there is nothing particularly special about 30 percent, the results in 
the Table show that cut-offs at 25 percent or 35 percent give a very similar picture. 
Thus far, we have focused on the total share of immigrants in a neighborhood, 
effectively treating them as a homogenous group. Much of the literature rightly focuses on 
the extent to which immigrants within a neighborhood are similar. In the context of 
segregation, one may have an area with very high immigrant density but low segregation, 
with many nationalities uniformly represented. Alternatively, enclaves may be primarily 
composed of immigrants from the same ethnic background (e.g. local clusters of particular 
nationalities). To examine the importance of immigrant homogeneity in generating the crime 
effects we observe, in Table 4 we show results from we re-estimating the column (3) 
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specification of Table 3 now additionally including neighborhood share dummies for 
particular immigrant region-of-birth concentrations. So for example in the first column of 
Table 4, we allow for additional effects on crime for neighborhoods with more than 10 
percent of the population coming from one of the four regions-of-birth groups. For 
reasonably low levels of group concentration, the results of the previous table remain 
unchanged with strong negative effects in immigrant enclaves and no additional effect from 
group concentrations. However, as the size of the more homogenous groups increases, we see 
a clear pattern emerging. As particular immigrant groups reach around 20 percent of the 
population of a neighborhood, we see very substantial and beneficial effects on total crime.11 
In these specifications, the overall immigrant enclave effect is somewhat reduced, but 
remains statistically significant. These results suggest the following overall conclusion. 
Neighborhoods with high immigrant densities have lower crime rates, all else equal. This 
beneficial effect is reinforced in those neighborhoods that also have high concentrations of 
immigrants from the same region-of-birth.  
In Table 5, we switch to the BCS data and estimate models of crime victimisation at 
the individual level. One simple explanation of the results reported so far could be that the 
probability of reporting a crime varies by immigrant concentration and that this is the effect 
we are capturing. It is difficult to see why this would generate the non-linear pattern we 
observe in Figures 4A and 4B, but it could certainly help to explain the lower crime rates in 
the enclaves. Fortunately, the BCS data allow us to model all crimes, not just those that are 
reported. The results control for both LSOA-level effects, using the same set of controls as in 
Table 3, and also individual level demographics. Most importantly, we control for region of 
birth so we allow different immigrant groups to have different crime experiences and 
reporting propensities. Comparing results with and without controls shows that we generally 
improve the precision of the immigrant neighborhood effect estimates by controlling for other 
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factors. Immigrants in general appear to be less likely to report being victims of crime. 
Controlling for this, we again find significant beneficial effects of immigrant enclaves on 
crime victimisation. We find no such effects for lower levels of immigrant concentration – 
highlighting again the non-linear nature of the relationship. When we include area immigrant 
density, the neighborhood enclave becomes marginally less significant, but of roughly the 
same order of magnitude.  
Are all crime types lower in the immigrant enclaves? To explore this, Table 6 presents 
estimates for a range of different crimes. We estimate the models for violent and non-violent 
crime, and further disaggregate non-violent crime into robbery, burglary, car theft and 
vandalism. Interestingly, we find no evidence of a link between immigrant concentration and 
violent crime, nor when we focus on the more serious components of non-violent crime such 
as robbery and burglary. The link is only there for the more minor non-violent crimes such as 
vehicle theft and vandalism. This suggests that the immigrant enclaves are successful in 
reducing crime by lowering levels of anti-social and opportunistic crime, rather than by 
reducing the rate of crime committed by career criminals. 
It is natural to wonder whether these enclave effects are experienced only by 
immigrants or whether natives living in enclaves also benefit from reduced crime. To 
examine this, Table 7 shows BCS results from interacting the immigrant share dummies with 
an individual-level immigrant indicator. Thus, we allow for differential neighborhood effects 
for natives and immigrants, while controlling for all the other characteristics of the 
neighborhood and individual. Interestingly, the evidence seems to suggest that both natives 
and immigrants benefit from the enclave effect. Immigrants experience more of a reduction in 
non-violent crime than natives – though even natives see a significant fall in non-violent 
crime. These results are important since it could be argued that immigrants in enclaves have 
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higher propensities to deny being victims of crime due to social pressures. It is hard to see 
why natives would feel the same pressure, and yet they also experience beneficial effects. 
Thus far, we have treated the immigrant density in a neighborhood as being 
exogenous. There is a vast literature that focuses on the likely sorting of individuals across 
neighborhoods that would violate such an assumption. The standard approach is then to 
instrument immigrant density with a constructed variable that attempts to capture the 
exogenous variation in that density across neighborhoods. We have therefore computed the 
standard instrument used in the immigration literature that exploits the fact that immigrants 
from particular nationalities tend to exhibit strong persistence in their location choices based 
on prior immigrant settlement of the same nationality (an argument dating back to Altonji and 
Card, 1991).12 The instrument is then the predicted change in the share of immigrants in a 
neighborhood, computed by using the initial distribution of migrants across neighborhoods in 
the local authority (by nationality) interacted with the national inflow of immigrants by 
nationality. Thus, it is assumed that new immigrants flow to neighborhoods in proportion to 
the previous stock of immigrants of the same nationality in the neighborhood. 
One practical difficulty we face in implementing this instrument is that the definition 
of neighborhood changed between the 1991 and 2001 census. The LSOAs used in our 
empirical work were introduced in 2001. In 1991, we have instead over 100,000 Enumeration 
Districts (ED). We match each ED to an LSOA – and thus there are multiple EDs for most 
LSOAs - and compute the initial distribution of immigrants within the LSOA by nationality 
(using 15 groups – a combination of countries and regions of birth). We then estimate the 
predicted change in the share of immigrants between 1991 and 2001 for each LSOA and use 
this to instrument the share of immigrants in each LSOA in 2001. 
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 Unfortunately, the instrument is not designed to predict enclaves alone. We will have 
more to say on this identification issue in the next section. For the present, we estimate three 
alternative models. All the models use the specification given in Column (3) of Table 3. First, 
we simply replace the immigrant share dummies we have used so far with the continuous 
measure of immigrant share. Second, we also include a squared immigrant share term. Third, 
since only the immigrant enclave dummy was significant in Table 3, we include this dummy 
but omit the other immigrant share dummies. We instrument using the predicted change in 
the immigrant share (and its square when we have the two endogenous regressors).  
 The first three columns of Table 8 report the OLS results for the alternative 
specifications, while the IV estimates are given in the final three columns. The OLS estimates 
show a negative effect of immigrant share on crime, driven by the negative effects in the 
enclaves. If we allow for a quadratic, we obtain negative coefficients on both terms, though 
neither is significant.13 Finally, if we only include the immigrant enclave dummy, we recover 
almost the identical coefficient as in Table 3. The IV estimates show that for the first two 
specifications, the pattern is broadly similar and the quadratic term becomes significantly 
negative. Interestingly when we use the predicted change in the immigrant share as an 
instrument for the enclave dummy, the instrument appears to retain significant power, with a 
first stage F-statistic of over 200. The IV estimate is significantly negative and twice as large 
as the OLS estimates, suggesting even stronger negative effects of enclaves on crime. 
4. INTERPRETATION OF THE ENCLAVE EFFECT 
Our results from the previous section suggest a beneficial effect on crime from living in an 
immigrant enclave and that immigrant homogeneity within the enclave lowers crime by even 
more. This beneficial effect cannot be ascribed simply to the idea that immigrants are less 
likely to commit crime than natives. Even if that were true, for which the evidence is not 
strong (see the survey by Bell and Machin, 2012), we would expect to observe a negative 
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linear relationship between immigrant density and crime across neighborhoods. However, as 
Figures 4A and 4B demonstrate, this is not the case. Beneficial effects from immigrant 
neighborhoods only appear when we reach a point somewhere around 30 percent immigrant 
density. Indeed, there appears to be no relationship between crime and immigrant density for 
the majority of neighborhoods that have low to medium immigrant shares. 
One explanation for our findings is that individuals who locate in enclaves are simply 
ex-ante less likely to commit crime than observably similar individuals in less segregated 
areas. In other words there is a sorting of individuals (immigrants and/or natives) by 
unobserved criminal propensity, but the impact of this sorting only becomes substantial in 
enclave areas. It seems to us unlikely that either standard instrumental variable methods or 
displacement policy experiments can adequately deal with such sorting. IV methods are 
suitable when the object is to control for sorting over the entire cross-section of immigrant 
areas but are likely to have low explanatory power at the extremes of the distribution where 
we observe the key effects. Note that this is just as true if our focus were instead on those 
areas where there are almost no immigrants. Similarly, displacement policy experiments 
rarely generate exogenous enclaves since policymakers are naturally loath to artificially 
create neighborhoods with high immigrant densities. 
An alternative explanation is that individuals who locate in enclaves are just as likely 
ex-ante to commit crime as others, but that subsequent social interactions generate a 
dependence between individual crime participation decisions and the actions of others in the 
neighborhood. That such social interactions matter is clear from the fact that two-thirds of all 
criminals commit crimes jointly (Reiss, 1980). A model of crime and social interactions is 
developed by Glaeser et al. (1996). In their model, individuals are arranged on a lattice, and 
individual decisions about crime are a function of individual attributes and of their neighbors’ 
decisions about criminal activities. There are two types of individual: (1) those who influence 
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and are influenced by their neighbors and (2) those who influence their neighbors, but who 
cannot themselves be influenced (“fixed agents”). These fixed agents can be thought of as 
either the law-abiding or the hardened criminal. The influence that is exerted by neighbors 
can be information flows about criminal techniques and the returns to crime, or behavioral 
influences that determine the costs of crime or the tastes for crime (e.g. family values, social 
norms) and monitoring by close neighbors. For the purposes of this discussion, the crucial 
result is that crime in a neighborhood is a function both of the fraction of individuals that can 
be influenced (the non fixed-agents) and the relative proportion of the law-abiding among the 
fixed-agents. At the extreme, if all fixed-agents are law-abiding, there is no crime.  
What can such a model say about immigrant concentrations? For both immigrants and 
natives there are two effects. First, the proportion of individuals in the neighborhood that can 
be influenced may change. Suppose immigrants can only be influenced by other immigrants 
and vice versa. Then a more mixed community provides fewer social interactions than a very 
segregated area. Second, the distribution of fixed agents may change. It is often argued that 
immigrant enclaves enable the enforcement of strong social norms. If one such norm is 
abiding by the law, the proportion of law-abiders among the fixed-agents may increase. 
Interestingly, this implies that even natives may adjust their criminal behaviour toward the 
social norm of the immigrants, provided natives can be influenced by immigrant fixed-agents. 
What is also clear from this discussion is that there is no particular reason to expect linearity 
in any immigrant concentration-crime effect.  
There are various other models that can generate multiple equilibria in crime rates 
within neighborhoods. Suppose for example that the law-abiding within a neighborhood 
directly monitor criminals (e.g. via neighborhood watch schemes). Then as the number of 
law-abiding citizens rises within a neighborhood, crime detection rates rise and the returns to 
crime fall. Alternatively, if there is a stigma attached to criminal behaviour, then as the 
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number of criminals in a neighborhood rises, the average criminal becomes a “normal” 
member of the society, stigma falls and more crime is committed.  
We can provide some suggestive evidence on these explanations by examining survey 
data. We use both the BCS and the recently introduced Understanding Society survey.14 At 
present the only available data for this latter survey is the 2009 cross-section, though over 
time this will become a panel. Crucially however, the cross-section identifies the LSOA of 
the individual respondent so that we can link the responses to the same neighborhoods as 
used in the previous section. We focus here on two questions. First, we look at measures of 
social interaction that try to capture the extent of trust and cooperation within a neighborhood. 
Is there are any evidence that immigrant enclaves differ from more mixed neighborhoods 
along these dimensions? Second, we examine some behavioral measures of individuals to see 
whether those who live in enclaves appear different along such observable dimensions. This 
is not to claim that such measures are causally related to criminal behaviour, but rather to 
investigate whether there appear significant differences in individuals across neighborhoods 
that may indicate sorting. 
 To capture social interactions, we consider the following measures: (1) “Friendships 
in my neighborhood mean a lot to me” (Friends), (2) “I borrow things and exchange favours 
with my neighbors” (Favours) and (3) “I regularly stop and talk with people in my 
neighborhood” (Talk). For behaviour, we look at two measures: (1) “Do you belong to a 
religion?” (Religion) and (2) “Do you ever visit a public house?” (Alcohol). For social 
interactions, respondents are asked to answer one to five for each question, with one being 
strongly agree and five being strongly disagree. We estimate ordered probit models (and 
invert the order to ensure sign comparability with the behavior questions) for each response 
and allow for an extensive set of individual controls. For the behaviour questions, the 
responses are yes/no so we estimate binary probit models. Our interest here is in whether 
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there are observable differences in responses across neighborhoods with different immigrant 
concentrations. 
 Table 9 shows the results for each of the measures. We find no evidence that 
immigrant enclaves have more powerful social interactions. Indeed at the margin, people who 
live in enclaves report that friends in the neighborhood are somewhat less important to them 
than those living in less immigrant-dense neighborhoods. There is no evidence that they are 
more likely to exchange favours and talk to their neighbors. Two caveats are important here. 
First, we ideally would focus on the at-risk group who are likely to be potential criminals i.e. 
mainly young males, and examine their social interactions. Unfortunately sample size 
precludes such an exercise. Second, it is difficult to know whether the measures we use are 
truly capturing the social interactions we are interested in.  
 Turning to measures of individual behaviour, we find much stronger effects. 
Individuals living in immigrant enclaves are much more likely to be a member of a religion 
than those living in more mixed neighborhoods. In addition, they are much less likely to visit 
public houses. Here the effect builds as we move across immigrant neighborhoods rather than 
occurring solely in the enclaves, but is stronger in the enclaves than elsewhere. Recall that all 
these models control for region of birth, so these results cannot be explained simply as a 
result of immigrants being more religious and less likely to consume alcohol. It would appear 
that there is significant sorting across neighborhoods on individual behaviour. 
 Of course, none of the evidence presented here can definitively distinguish between 
alternative explanations of the enclave-crime relationship we observe in the data. Our aim has 
rather been to highlight some potentially channels through which we might explain the 
observed correlation and see whether some simple measures provide support. The growth of 
the immigrant enclave is a reasonably new phenomenon in the U.K. and has received little 
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attention in the economics literature. It is an area for future research to understand more fully 
what is going on in these high-density immigrant areas, and the implications of such areas 
both for crime and other socio-economic outcomes.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The impact of immigrant neighborhoods on the socio-economic outcomes of both immigrant 
and natives has been a topic of intense debate among economists and other social scientists. 
A key feature of this work has been the tendency of migrants to locate in the same place as 
previous migrants from their country, and thus the formation of migrant enclaves. This paper 
has presented new evidence on the pattern of immigrant residential segregation in England 
since 1971. It shows that one important development over this period has been the rise of the 
immigrant enclave, a neighborhood where immigrants account for a substantial proportion of 
the local population. If we define an immigrant enclave as a neighborhood with at least 30 
percent immigrant population, we find that in 1971, 15 percent of immigrants lived in an 
enclave. By 2001, this proportion had risen to 31 percent.  
There is nothing particularly mysterious about this development. The stock of 
immigrants rose by 57 percent over this period. If the increase was distributed across 
neighborhoods in exact proportion to the initial distribution of immigrants, the proportion in 
enclaves would have been 32 percent. By contrast, if the increase had been distributed 
randomly, the share would have been 17 percent. Therefore, the tendency for immigrants to 
locate in areas of prior-immigrant settlement, combined with a large increase in the number 
of immigrants, has generated this increase in the importance of enclaves. However, this is not 
just an issue for immigrants. In 1971, just over 700,000 natives lived in immigrant enclaves 
(1.7 percent of the native population). By 2001, this had risen to 2.3m (5.2 percent of the 
native population). If there are immigrant neighborhood effects on outcome variables such as 
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crime, the policy relevance of such effects has increased by an order of magnitude as a result 
of the population changes over the last few decades. 
 We find strong and consistent evidence that enclaves have lower crime experiences 
than otherwise observably similar neighborhoods that have a lower immigrant share of the 
population. This effect appears to be significant when we reach somewhere between 20-30 
percent immigrant share and is observed whether we use recorded crime data or self-reported 
crime victimisation data. The effect is present for both natives and immigrants, though it 
appears somewhat larger for immigrants. In terms of disaggregated crime types, the effect is 
coming through the more minor crime categories such as car theft and vandalism rather than 
more serious crimes such as violence, robbery and burglary. The effects are more pronounced 
in neighborhoods with concentrations of immigrants from the same ethnic background, 
emphasizing the importance of homogeneity.  
 There are a number of key questions that remain for future research and we choose to 
highlight two. First, how can one identify the causal effect of immigrant neighborhoods on 
crime? To do so, we would need an equivalent of the Moving to Opportunity experiment used 
to identify the causal effect of poor neighborhoods on crime (Kling et al., 2005). Second, 
there is the more understudied question of what mechanisms are capable of generating this 
beneficial enclave effect of crime? This would seem to be an important area, both for 
generating a better understanding of the key findings and for their relevance to policy debates 
about immigration. 
                                                          
1  The focus here is on empirical connections between crime and immigrant segregation/the presence of 
immigrant enclaves. See Bell et al. (2010) for an analysis of the relationship between crime and immigration 
more generally. 
2 The analysis is on England so as to be consistent throughout the paper, because the crime data we later focus 
on is only available for England. The analysis of immigrant segregation in this section can be carried out for 
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England and Wales (but not Scotland and Northern Ireland as the spatial classifications are different there). 
Doing so produced very similar results to the ones we report for England only (these results are available from 
the authors on request).  
3 The linking of the 1971-1991 censuses for 1981 wards is documented in Martin et al. (2002). Consistent data 
can be downloaded from the Linking Censuses through Time website (http://cdu.mimas.ac.uk/lct/).  
4 There are 175,361 OAs in England and Wales in 2001. The link file shows that 39,240 of these OAs lie 
entirely within a 1991 ED. The remaining 136,121 require their population to be allocated across two or more 
1991 EDs. This could cause substantial mis-measurement in our data. However we are only interested in the 
1981 ward match i.e. since we combine 1991 EDs together to produce our ward-level data we are only 
concerned with those occasions where a 2001 OA lies across 1991 EDs that are themselves not part of the same 
1981 ward. Of the 175,361 OAs, 161,575 (92.1 percent) lie entirely within 1991 EDs that are in the same 1981 
ward. More than half of the remaining 8 percent have more than three-quarters of their population within the 
same 1981 ward. Thus while the matching is inevitably not perfect, we conclude that the induced measurement 
error is likely to be small.  
5 We also calculated the closely-related isolation index (see Cutler et al., 2008a, for a definition) and found very 
similar trends to those reported using the dissimilarity index - results are available on request from the authors. 
6 There may be a worry that the picture of declining segregation comes about from the use of particular artificial 
neighborhoods imposed on us by the need to maintain consistency across censuses. We therefore also re-
estimated dissimilarity indices for alternative neighborhood definitions. While these are not consistent across 
censuses, they allow us to examine the importance of neighborhood size and whether the overall trend decline in 
segregation would be picked up without using the consistent ward data. Appendix Table A1 reports the results 
and the modest trend decline is still clear. For 2001, we can identify a set of increasingly large neighborhoods. 
Thus, it seems that the decline in segregation that we observe is not plausibly explained by measurement issues. 
 
7To check that the crime index is correctly measuring recorded crime, we calculated the average crime index 
across all LSOAs in the same local authority and correlated this with published recorded crime rates for local 
authorities. The population-weighted correlation was 0.91. 
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8Of course the same applies to recorded crime. If immigrants disproportionately fail to report crime this will bias 
inference. In the individual-level regressions we can directly control for immigrant status to remove the average 
difference in victimisation and self-reporting propensities. 
9 Our results are robust if we estimate the cross-sections separately and average the coefficients or if we average 
the data across years within an LSOA and run a simple cross-section. 
10 We also experimented with area share dummies to match the LSOA share dummies. The effects again point to 
a larger negative effect on crime from more immigrant-dense areas, but the coefficients on the neighborhood 
share dummies remained almost precisely the same as in Column 4 of Table 3. 
11 A referee suggested using the interaction between immigrant shares in a neighborhood and the extent of 
fractionalization within the neighborhood as an alternative to identify the importance of homogeneity of 
immigrant groups on crime. The index of fractionalization measures the extent to which immigrants within a 
neighborhood share a common background. We would expect that if homogeneity of immigrants matters for our 
effects, enclaves with low levels of fractionalization would see a more beneficial effect on crime rates than 
enclaves with higher levels of fractionalization. This is indeed what we find. These results are available upon 
request, but we find the use of groups share dummies used in Table 4 to be a more transparent way of 
illustrating the importance of immigrant group homogeneity. 
12 We also experimented with an instrument based on the distribution of occupations across neighborhoods and 
the occupational characteristics of immigrants. This approach is used by Cutler et al. (2008b) and is predicated 
on the assumption that individuals sort into areas partly based on their occupation. The results are very similar to 
those reported using the alternative instrument and are available upon request. 
13 Interestingly, if we allow for a quartic in immigrant share to more accurately capture the non-linearities, we 
find that all four terms are individually significant at the 1 percent level. This simply highlights again how 
important non-linearities are in capturing the nature of the relationship. 
14 The Understanding Society survey is a new study of the socio-economic circumstances and attitudes of about 
100,000 individuals in 40,000 British households. 
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TABLE 1: IMMIGRANT SEGREGATION IN ENGLAND, 1971-2001 
 
Year/Country of Origin 
 
Number of 
Immigrants 
 
Dissimilarity 
  Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
    
1971 2.89m 0.232 0.093 
   Republic of Ireland 0.64m 0.182 0.053 
   South Asia 0.43m 0.439 0.162 
   European 0.57m 0.215 0.069 
   African NC 0.15m 0.346 0.127 
   Old Commonwealth 0.12m 0.236 0.059 
    
1981 3.15m 0.214 0.100 
    
1991 3.51m 0.193 0.096 
    
2001 4.53m 0.183 0.094 
   Republic of Ireland 0.46m 0.129 0.046 
   South Asia 0.90m 0.367 0.145 
   European 0.99m 0.149 0.056 
   African NC 0.56m 0.203 0.079 
   Old Commonwealth 0.21m 0.217 0.070 
    
 
Note: Summary statistics are weighted by the number of immigrants residing in the community. There are 8,461 wards in England that have 
at least some population in all years. South Asia refers to India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Bangladesh was part of Pakistan until 1971. 
African NC refers to New Commonwealth Africa only. 
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR LSOAS 
  Immigrant Share 
  0-2% 2-5% 5-10% 10-30% 30%+ 
      
Index of Multiple Deprivation 27.3 19.9 17.1 23.3 33.3 
Crime Score 0.01 -0.19 -0.11 0.33 0.53 
Income Score 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.26 
Employment Score 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.12 
Health and Disability Score 0.54 -0.01 -0.32 -0.01 0.28 
% Black 0.1 0.3 0.9 5.1 14.2 
% Asian 0.4 0.9 2.6 10.7 27.2 
% Young 18.0 17.4 18.1 21.2 22.4 
% No Quals 38.1 31.1 26.2 24.5 27.1 
% Degree 11.5 15.8 20.5 27.4 30.8 
      
Number of LSOAs 3711 12874 7847 5546 2504 
      
            
 
Note: Data from the Indices of Deprivation (first 5 rows) are indices in which a larger number indicates a worse outcome. 
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TABLE 3: CRIME SCORE AND ENCLAVES, 2004-10 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Immigrant Share 2%-5% 0.002 0.050** 0.022 0.023 
 (0.022) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Immigrant Share 5%-10% 0.109** 0.087** 0.025 0.028 
 (0.032) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Immigrant Share 10%-30% 0.286** 0.054** -0.000 0.012 
 (0.038) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) 
Immigrant Share 30%+ 0.314** -0.135** -0.138**   -0.101** 
 (0.053) (0.043) (0.042) (0.037) 
     
Area Immigrant Share     -0.337* 
    (0.189) 
     
Non-White Share 2%-5%   0.091** 0.092** 
   (0.010) (0.010) 
Non-White Share 5%-10%   0.131**     0.134** 
   (0.020) (0.020) 
Non-White Share 10%-30%   0.118**     0.129** 
   (0.027) (0.028) 
Non-White Share 30%+   0.023 0.055 
   (0.035) (0.040) 
     
ln(Population Density)  -0.030** -0.034** -0.033** 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Poor Income Score  -0.014 0.109 0.129 
  (0.154) (0.152) (0.147) 
Poor Employment Score  1.347** 1.306**    1.304** 
  (0.240) (0.240) (0.239) 
Health Deprivation Score  0.213** 0.206**     0.204** 
  (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Young Share  -0.116 -0.175 -0.172 
  (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) 
Old Share  -0.421** -0.376**   -0.383** 
  (0.090) (0.089) (0.090) 
     
Sample Size 97,446 97,446 97,446 97,446 
     
R-Squared 0.419 0.644 0.646 0.646 
     
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the local authority level. Additional LSOA-level controls included (but not reported here) are 
education and training deprivation score, barriers to housing score, living environment score, 10 to 15 year olds share, no qualifications 
share, degree and above share, houses share, flat share, shared dwelling share, communal areas present, one family dwelling share, and other 
family dwelling share. Regressions are weighted by the population in the LSOA and include year dummies.  
* and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% level respectively.  
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TABLE 4: IMMIGRANT GROUP SHARE EFFECTS 
     
∆: 10% 15% 20% 25% 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Immigrant Share 2%-5% 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.022 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Immigrant Share 5%-10% 0.021 0.024 0.026 0.026 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Immigrant Share 10%-20% -0.002 0.005 0.010 0.011 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
Immigrant Share 20%-30% -0.081** -0.050 -0.039 -0.044 
 (0.040) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Immigrant Share 30%+ -0.223*** -0.135*** -0.106** -0.109** 
 (0.061) (0.050) (0.048) (0.047) 
     
     
European Share ∆%+ 0.024 -0.028 -0.199** -0.233*** 
 (0.028) (0.035) (0.087) (0.017) 
Asian Share ∆%+ -0.010 -0.135*** -0.216*** -0.304*** 
 (0.023) (0.035) (0.052) (0.076) 
African Share ∆%+ 0.046 -0.047 -0.080 -0.103 
 (0.040) (0.053) (0.053) (0.108) 
Other Non-Native Share ∆%+ 0.055* -0.126 0.166 -0.421* 
 (0.032) (0.093) (0.354) (0.250) 
     
     
Sample Size 97446 97446 97446 97446 
     
R-squared 0.646 0.646 0.647 0.647 
     
 
 Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the local authority level. The regressions use the specification in Column 3 of  
 Table 3. We also include a dummy for LSOAs containing the two largest USAF airbases in the UK. 
 * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% level respectively.  
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TABLE 5 : CRIME VICTIMISATION AND ENCLAVES, 2006-10 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Immigrant Share 2%-5% 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Immigrant Share 5%-10% 0.007 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Immigrant Share 10%-30% 0.008 -0.020* -0.011 -0.008 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
Immigrant Share 30%+ -0.037** -0.064** -0.045** -0.036* 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) 
     
Area Immigrant Share    -0.099 
    (0.075) 
     
Non-White Share 2%-5%   -0.004 -0.004 
   (0.005) (0.005) 
Non-White Share 5%-10%   0.005 0.005 
   (0.009) (0.009) 
Non-White Share 10%-30%   -0.010 -0.008 
   (0.012) (0.012) 
Non-White Share 30%+   -0.036* -0.027 
   (0.018) (0.020) 
     
European Immigrant  -0.062** -0.062** -0.062** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Asian Immigrant  -0.095** -0.095** -0.095** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
African Immigrant  -0.033** -0.033** -0.033** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Other Immigrant  0.004 0.004 0.004 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Black  -0.058** -0.056** -0.056** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Asian  -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
ln(Population Density)  0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Urban Area  0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
Female  -0.020** -0.020** -0.020** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Young  0.097** 0.097** 0.097** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Old  -0.088** -0.088**   -0.088** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
     
LA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Sample Size 131,079 119,882 119,882 119,882 
     
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the local authority level. The regressions also include the full set of LSOA-level controls used in Table 
3 and dummies for inner-city and living on a housing estate. Regressions are weighted by BCS sample weights and include year dummies. 
 * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% level respectively.
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TABLE 6: CRIME VICTIMISATION TYPES AND ENCLAVES 
 
 Violent Non-Violent Burglary Vehicle Vandalism Robbery 
       
Immigrant Share 2%-5% -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.005 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) 
 
Immigrant Share 5%-10% 0.002 -0.006 0.005* 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) 
 
Immigrant Share 10%-30% -0.003 -0.018* 0.004 -0.009 -0.007 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) 
 
Immigrant Share 30%+ -0.004 -0.059** 0.003 -0.024** -0.020** -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.002) 
       
       
LA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Sample Size 119,882 119,882 119,882 119,882 119,882 119,882 
       
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the local authority level. The regressions also include the full set of LSOA-level controls used in Table 
5 and dummies for inner-city and living on a housing estate. Regressions are weighted by BCS sample weights and included year dummies. 
Vehicle includes any vehicle related crime and robbery consists only of theft from a person. The vehicle regression also controls for vehicle 
ownership.  
* and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 7: IMMIGRANT AND NATIVE ENCLAVE EFFECTS 
 
            Total               Violent                           Non-Violent      
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Native Effect 
 
 
Immigrant Share 2%-5% 0.003 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) 
 
Immigrant Share 5%-10% 0.001 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.008) 
 
Immigrant Share 10%-20% -0.006 -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.009) 
 
Immigrant Share 20%-30% -0.042** -0.001 -0.043** 
 (0.015) (0.006) (0.013) 
 
Immigrant Share 30%+ -0.070** -0.005 -0.063** 
 (0.019) (0.005) (0.016) 
 
Immigrant Effect 
 
 
Immigrant Share 2%-5% -0.029 -0.013* -0.011 
 (0.026) (0.006) (0.029) 
 
Immigrant Share 5%-10% -0.043 -0.015** -0.023 
 (0.026) (0.005) (0.028) 
 
Immigrant Share 10%-20% -0.078** -0.019** -0.049* 
 (0.025) (0.004) (0.026) 
 
Immigrant Share 20%-30% -0.104** -0.017** -0.077** 
 (0.024) (0.005) (0.026) 
 
Immigrant Share 30%+ -0.130** -0.015** -0.106** 
 (0.024) (0.006) (0.025) 
 
 
LA Fixed Effects     Yes                  Yes   Yes  
 
 
Sample Size  119,882               119,882                             119,882  
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the local authority level. The regressions also include the full set of LSOA-level controls used in Table 
4.  Regressions are weighted by BCS sample weights and include year dummies.  
* and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% level respectively.  
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TABLE 8: CRIME SCORE AND INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION 
 
 OLS IV    
       
Immigrant Share    -0.918** -0.500     -0.945** 0.541  
 (0.183) (0.419)  (0.283) (0.650)  
Immigrant Share Squared  -0.744      -2.521**  
  (0.805)   (1.166)  
Immigrant Enclave   -0.136**      -0.312** 
   (0.032)   (0.090) 
       
       
LA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
First Stage F-statistic 
(Immigrant Share) 
   805.3 606.8 214.0 
     296.9  
First Stage F-statistic 
(Immigrant Share Squared) 
      
       
Sample Size 97,446 97,446 97,446 97,446 97,446 97,446 
       
R-Squared 0.646 0.646 0.646 0.646 0.645 0.645 
       
 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the local authority level. Additional LSOA-level controls included (but not reported here) are the 
same as in Column 3 of Table 5. Immigrant share and immigrant share squared are instrumented using the predicted change in immigrant 
share (and its square) from 1991 Enumeration Districts mapped into 2001 LSOAs. 
 * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% level respectively.  
9 
 
 
 
TABLE 9: ENCLAVES, SOCIAL INTERACTIONS AND BEHAVIORS 
 
 Understanding Society British Crime Survey 
      
 Friends Favours Talk Religion Alcohol 
      
Immigrant Share 2%-5% -0.007 -0.028 -0.028 -0.012* -0.013 
   (0.048)   (0.046)   (0.050) (0.006) (0.008) 
      
Immigrant Share 5%-10% -0.018 -0.043 -0.019 -0.009   -0.022** 
   (0.057)   (0.053)   (0.056) (0.008) (0.011) 
      
Immigrant Share 10%-30% -0.090 -0.058 -0.030 0.008    -0.054** 
   (0.074)   (0.071)   (0.077) (0.009) (0.014) 
      
Immigrant Share 30%+ -0.228* -0.129 -0.035     0.049**    -0.109** 
 (0.135)  (0.130)  (0.122) (0.015) (0.022) 
      
LA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Sample Size 15009 14954 14800 119882 119882 
      
 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the local authority level. Columns (1)-(3) use data from the Understanding Society survey and are 
ordered probits (with higher outcomes representing more agreement).  Columns (4) and (5) use data from the British Crime Survey and are 
0/1 probits. All regressions are weighted and include year dummies and the LSOA controls used in Table 3. 
 * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% level respectively.  
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Figure 1: Distribution of Immigrant Concentration Across Neighborhoods – LSOAs in 
England, 2001 
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Figure 2: Immigrant Densities Across LSOAs in England, 2001 
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Figure 3: Crime Score Quintiles Across LSOAs in England, 2004-10 
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Figure 4A: Local Polynomial of Immigrant Neighborhood Effect on Crime Score 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4B: Local Polynomial of Immigrant Neighborhood Effect on Crime Score  
Controlling for Ethnic-Share in Neighborhood 
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TABLE A1: ALTERNATIVE CENSUS GEOGRAPHIES 
 
Year/Geography 
 
# Units 
 
Population 
 
 % Enclaves 
 
% Immigrants 
in Enclaves 
 
Dissimilarity 
      
1971      
   Enumeration District 101,865 439 4.9 24.1 0.324 
   1981 Ward 8,461 5,298 1.3 14.6 0.232 
      
1981      
   Enumeration District 104,209 439 5.7 24.6 0.286 
   1981 Ward 8,461 5,407 1.9 17.6 0.214 
      
1991      
   Enumeration District 103,101 456 5.7 26.3 0.253 
   1981 Ward 8,461 5,554 2.5 20.9 0.193 
      
2001      
   Output Area 165,628 297 7.4 34.7 0.258 
   Lower Super Output Area 32,477 1,513 7.7 33.1 0.213 
   Middle Super Output Area 6,780 7,247 7.5 31.6 0.186 
   1981 Ward 8,461 5,801 4.3 31.1 0.183 
      
 
Note: The dissimilarity index is weighted by the number of immigrants residing in the community. Enclaves are defined as those 
neighborhoods with more than 30% of the population being immigrant.  
15 
 
 
TABLE A2: DISTRIBUTION OF IMMIGRANTS IN CENSUS WARDS IN ENGLAND 
 
  
1971 
 
1981 
 
1991 
 
2001 
 
     
A. Ward Count     
     
Immigrant % Share: 
 
    
Exactly 0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0-1 4.8 2.8 1.7 0.8 
1-2 19.5 17.4 14.7 9.8 
2-5 47.9 50.1 51.1 47.3 
5-10 17.9 18.7 20.0 25.7 
10-20 6.6 6.3 6.6 8.7 
20-30 2.0 2.8 3.3 3.3 
30-50 1.3 1.9 2.4 4.1 
50-100 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 
     
B. Immigrant Population     
     
Immigrant % Share: 
 
    
0-1 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.0 
1-2 3.9 3.4 2.9 1.5 
2-5 22.1 21.4 19.6 14.7 
5-10 21.3 20.9 19.8 19.2 
10-20 23.6 19.8 18.3 18.1 
20-30 14.0 16.8 18.4 15.3 
30-50 13.9 16.4 19.4 28.6 
50-100 0.7 1.2 1.4 2.6 
     
 
Note: There are 8,461 wards in England that have at least some population in all years. 
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TABLE A3 : ALTERNATIVE ENCLAVE DEFINITIONS 
     
∆: 20% 25% 30% 35% 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Immigrant Share 2%-5% 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Immigrant Share 5%-10% 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.021 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Immigrant Share 10%-20% 0.006 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) 
Immigrant Share 20%-∆%  -0.044 -0.084** -0.097** 
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) 
Immigrant Share ∆%+ -0.093** -0.168** -0.210** -0.225** 
 (0.040) (0.049) (0.054) (0.058) 
     
Non-White Share 2%-5% 0.091** 0.091** 0.091** 0.091** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Non-White Share 5%-10% 0.130** 0.129** 0.129** 0.129** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Non-White Share 10%-30% 0.128** 0.126** 0.125** 0.124** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Non-White Share 30%+ 0.030 0.058 0.066* 0.056 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) 
     
ln(Population Density) -0.034** -0.034** -0.033** -0.033** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Poor Income Score 0.080 0.102 0.114 0.115 
 (0.159) (0.153) (0.151) (0.150) 
Poor Employment Score 1.310** 1.285** 1.293** 1.301** 
 (0.241) (0.238) (0.239) (0.240) 
Health Deprivation Score 0.209** 0.207** 0.204** 0.204** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Young Share -0.139 -0.140 -0.138 -0.147 
 (0.122) (0.122) (0.121) (0.121) 
Old Share -0.395** -0.401** -0.394** -0.391** 
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) 
     
Observations 97,446 97,446 97,446 97,446 
     
R-squared 0.645 0.646 0.646 0.646 
     
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the local authority level. The regressions use the specification in Column 3 of Table 3. 
* and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% level respectively.  
 
 
